{"@context":"http://iiif.io/api/presentation/3/context.json","id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/iiif/sb3ws8kb15/manifest","type":"Manifest","label":{"en":["Hollis, Mark"]},"logo":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/organizations/logo_images/000/000/289/original/CDCM_Mark_2.1.png?1728486742","metadata":[{"label":{"en":["Publisher"]},"value":{"en":["David J. Sencer CDC Museum"]}},{"label":{"en":["Date"]},"value":{"en":["1979"]}},{"label":{"en":["Description"]},"value":{"en":["Dr. Mark Hollis in a telephone interview in 1979 reflects on the transition of Malaria Control in War Areas to Communicable Disease Center, of which he was the first director.  Interviewed by by William Watson and Dr. William Foege. Recording starts late into conversation and recording is scratchy and occasionally drops off."]}},{"label":{"en":["Format"]},"value":{"en":["video"]}},{"label":{"en":["Type"]},"value":{"en":["oral history"]}}],"summary":{"en":["Dr. Mark Hollis in a telephone interview in 1979 reflects on the transition of Malaria Control in War Areas to Communicable Disease Center, of which he was the first director.  Interviewed by by William Watson and Dr. William Foege. Recording starts late into conversation and recording is scratchy and occasionally drops off."]},"provider":[{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/aboutus","type":"Agent","label":{"en":["David J. Sencer CDC Museum"]},"homepage":[{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/","type":"Text","label":{"en":["David J. Sencer CDC Museum"]},"format":"text/html"}],"logo":[{"id":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/organizations/logo_images/000/000/289/original/CDCM_Mark_2.1.png?1728486742","type":"Image"}]}],"thumbnail":[{"id":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/collection_resource_files/thumbnails/000/247/447/small/1722773471_1979_Hollis_Mark_faststart_1722773506.jpg?1722759106","type":"Image","format":"image/jpeg"}],"items":[{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447","type":"Canvas","label":{"en":["Media File 1 of 1 - 1979_Hollis_Mark_faststart.mp4"]},"duration":4926.207,"width":640,"height":360,"thumbnail":[{"id":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/collection_resource_files/thumbnails/000/247/447/small/1722773471_1979_Hollis_Mark_faststart_1722773506.jpg?1722759106","type":"Image","format":"image/jpeg"}],"items":[{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/content/1","type":"AnnotationPage","items":[{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/content/1/annotation/1","type":"Annotation","motivation":"painting","body":{"id":"https://aviary-p-globalhealthchronicles.s3.wasabisys.com/collection_resource_files/resource_files/000/247/447/original/1979_Hollis_Mark_faststart.mp4?1722773454","type":"Video","format":"video/mp4","duration":4926.207,"width":640,"height":360},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447","metadata":[]}]}],"annotations":[{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["[AssemblyAI Transcript] 1979 Hollis, Mark [Transcript]"]},"items":[{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/1","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eA:\u003c/strong\u003e It today is June 24, 1985, a beautiful summer's day in Atlanta. And Doctor Bill Faggie and I, I am Bill Watson, have the pleasure today of interviewing Doctor Mark Hollis, who was the director of MCWA, CDC's predecessor organization, from 1943 to 1946 and then was director, the first director of CDC from 1946 to early 1947, and was around at the beginning. So we are looking forward to hearing your accounts of firsthand how CDC began, some of the thinking that went into it, as well as the mood of the country and the public health service on government at that time. And perhaps a good way to start, Mark, would be for you to tell us a bit about your career before getting involved in MCWA and how the public health service was at that time.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=0.12,90.64"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/2","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eB:\u003c/strong\u003e Well, Bill, thank you. First, it's great to be back after all these years. It's good to see what's evolved here in Atlanta from the extremely modest MCWA of 45 and 46 as it emerged. And I'm not speaking really of the physical plan, impressive as this is looking at it this morning, but of the great contributions this center has made, it's to science, outstanding enviable reputation, not only nationally but internationally. And so it's great to be back. Well, I don't hardly know how to get into this background. I was born in the service, as it were. My dad was a medical officer in the public health service. So I whole life kind of grew up in service, really at an extremely early age. I was determined I was going to be in the public health service. I felt that way. And actually my dad kind of groomed me with expectation and certainty, really take medicine and would kind of fulfill this ambition that I kept speaking of. That's a long story in itself. I mentioned that background because there's a few things that come about. He went to China, incidentally, in 19, nine and eleven. He was at the hospital. He did surgery at the hospital in Hong Kong at the service hospital. That was in the days when we had hospitals overseas. But during that tenure, he saw human plague and treated human plague, a background that fit. Later when he came back, he was stationed a short time in California, then at the hospital in Mobile, Alabama, where we lived for a year or two. And when the earliest outbreak in New Orleans of plague come from the west coast, 1914, was immediately transferred to New Orleans to, for the service, to undertake that which turned out to be a rather extensive operation in control of the outbreak of plague in the Gulf area of the US. I remember it because there were some real early giants that were of the service officers that were down there. The Hugh de Vallon was Moc French Simpson, Dick Creel, all which have big names in the history of the service. Charlie Williams was in charge of the plague laboratories at the time. I wanted to make one mention that toward the end of the plague epidemic, there the officers met at our home for a dinner. And I remember this. I was about, let's see, I would be about seven, almost eight years old, but I remember Doctor Hugh de Vallon, a distinguished man, that they gave a toast and to the book that they had just put together that turned out to be Bulletin 87. That was kind of the early playbook on rats and the transmission. And they said, you will go down to Hudavel and you will be remembered for having worked with material out for this bubonic plague, for this bulletin 87. And he said this, and I remembered it. And why I remember it, I don't know. But I remember he said, I wish I was sure that what we are advocating on a plague epidemic, the mass poisoning of rats and mass methods of getting rid of rats, was a correct procedure. I don't know. I remember that distinctly. And as you know, years later on typhus, when we did, were able to work out the behavior pattern. That was another one of my early assignments. But before that, in Norfolk, Virginia, I was given a job by Doctor John Kerr for summer. I was finishing high school, and so I went to Cockspur island to do what the service was trying to do, to develop a method to, quote, pasteurize, end quote, oysters. The reason being that surgeon General Hugh Cummings was a Virginian, a distinguished man, and he felt that sooner or later there were going to be problems of pollution in oysters, particularly in the Chesapeake Bay. And those multi million dollar oyster beds might be in Jeff. He got an appropriation and set up on Craney island, this little research center. And I was there with the title of executive assistant or some such. But I was the dishwasher, and I had the media and I watched the autoclaves, and I lived on the island would depart at 430, but I lived on Ellen and watched the incubators at night and the water and the oyster tanks and so forth. We never did keep it short. We never did were able to develop any method of pasteurization. It would work, but it changed the physical characteristic of the oyster aesthetically. It turned out a horrible looking creature, kind of a pale white, and no one would certainly eat it. But in the process, which I won't get into, because it's a long story, but we threw a accident on weekend problems. We began to move some oysters that came in late Friday, and we didn't have time to do anything with them. We moved them over to a little estuary in the lower Chesapeake Bay, going down Willoughby spit, a little channeled in estuary, and we keep them there overnight or for a few days and then re harvest them. And again to keep short, we discovered that these oysters were cleaning up themselves. If you left them there a week or ten days or two weeks, we go dig, get them out, re harvest them, and they were pretty much freed. And that was the beginning of the transplant of oysters, the moving from contaminated waters to clean waters. So while we failed on the pasteurization, we set the stage for the method that's used today. You move your oysters from polluted waters into clean waters themselves, of living organisms, of bacteria, of germs. But of course, now we've got the problem of toxicity, which we won't get into. Well, anyway, that was the background and that. And Hugh Cummings, certainly Hugh Cummingous spent a lot of time he's vacationed in, and I got to know him. So it turned out that it meant that I had met five, served under five, surgeon general and you six in my lifetime. Well, at any rate, I had that and I changed my whole concept of what I wanted to do. I was having a lot of trouble with high school Latin, and I wasn't learning very much on foreign languages, but I love mathematics and science and physics and even chemistry. So I went back to my dad at that time, doctor John Kerr, who was a real giant in the history, the one that took Wyman's 1908 memorandum, and if you wish, we could get into that later on. But he was in charge of all the public health service activities in Anorfolk area, including the quarantine activities over at Fortress Monroe, and we were stationed over there at the time. My dad was on the old chase, the training ship chase lived on the chase. So I had to go to him and tell him I wasn't going to take medicine, I was going to take engineering and come in with that side of health. And he was quite distressed. I remember he turned to Doctor Curran, he said, john, did you hear that? That's the most stupid decision I think I ever grew up, son, up to make. But he didn't. I talked to him seriously and he said, if this is what you want to do, you do it. So that's what I did. So it was with that background I had my first assignment. Well, first I went in the army because I was a cadet colonel over here at the cadet corps, and that gave me the privilege on the Thompson Act. I was stationed at Fort Olthorpe on the back of a horse and a cowboy, and I began to wonder if we ever do have a problem, you're not going to fight it with sabers over the front end of that horse. And so I went on inactive duty and came down and met Doctor Rumreich, who at that time was working at the NIH with Jean Dyer, Badger and Rumreichen on what they thought was eastern Rocky Mountain fever. It was the outbreak in Savannah that they were working on, and he put me down. There was a rat trapper that was listed as rat trapping, and they were trapping with cage traps. I'm going to tie back to the New Orleans situation here because it's an interesting transition of how things happen, approaching disease problems. The people were using in Savannah, the old methods of the New Orleans Galveston, the Chiapas facility artist survey that was made by French Simpson later on after New Orleans. And when he set the levels of the infection of these particular fleas, the transmitters of plague, that they were using cage traps. And incidentally, a man could only handle even at best, because you were walking around your routes, you could only handle about six or eight of those cage traps, and you weren't getting enough rodents to really make any statistical impression. Well, from my background down at on coons in the early days, that rats follow routes and runs much like coons do. And I used to trap with steel traps with no bait to set them in the runs. So I said, let's try that. So we got double o traps. Man could take 50 easier than he could take eight of these big cage traps on his back, and he could set him. And then we speeded up and got a lot more rats and so forth. But what did we find out? We found out that the old French Simpson eyed concept that you would have, well, for the whole area of the Gulf coast, he felt about 2.8 cheapus faciatus per rat. We were finding an era, 32, 36, 28, and so forth. Why? So we began to look into that, and that was the first indication, I'll get into some of the background, but that these particular fleas live off the host a good bit of the time, plotted against temperature and humidity to a lesser extent. Well, about that time we had the big epidemic and our outbreak in Alabama. Kenneth Maxey had, as you know, old doctor Brill was the first to point out this peculiar disease. He called it braille disease, or it got to be known as braille disease. Kenneth Maxey had done some outstanding epidemiological research on that in Alabama, and I had a chance to meet with him. He was back visiting in Alabama. At the meantime, he had gone out to, to the medical school in University of Minnesota and had a delightful period with him, and he outlined all he knew. I told him what we found out in Savannah. He, in the meantime, left out the point, without getting into it, that the rumreich had emulsified all parasites and had found out that it was a parasite on the rat. And then it was long before we could back it up to cheer for. And so with that background, we worked on the work and developed the curves on temperature, behavior pattern. The trip is going too much detail, perhaps on it, but that was another background. And during that course, I was sent up to TVA, was formed, moving ahead in a malaria program. Doctor Bishop was another well known malariologist, was a medical officer in charge of that whole program at TVA. So I had an assignment with him all that by way that we were so short of offices with any background and tropical diseases, infections that I immediately was trying to earmarked to get into that field. So I worked with Louis in the early stages. We felt we ought to get out of Washington, that there was going to be too much congestion, too much problems in there. Let's move out. We considered three states for all the.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=90.64,996.958"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/3","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eA:\u003c/strong\u003e Was this after the war started?","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=996.958,999.43"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/4","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eB:\u003c/strong\u003e Oh, yes, after the war. It was, I guess a month after Pearl harbor that a longer. I'd forgotten the exact date we came down. It was. Well, no, I do remember it was in April. So it was several months after Pearl harbor, after the Pearl harbor episode, that we finally decided on Atlanta. The reasons, the justification, it favored Atlanta over the others. Washington, the fourth core area headquarters was here. Good rail, air hub. The access to Washington was quite good, and we knew we were going to have to maintain that. So Atlanta was chosen and we were sent down. That was about the. What were the other two, what were.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=999.43,1049.004"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/5","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eA:\u003c/strong\u003e The other two sites under consideration?","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=1049.004,1053.06"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/6","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eB:\u003c/strong\u003e One was in Texas with the support of Charlie Williams, and the other was in California because of the proximity moving into the Pacific theater, to what extent would the MCWA get actually involved in the war theaters was uncertain at that time. Fully concentrated. Let's set MCWA for the us pattern, recognizing we're going to have to probably be pulled into the other.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=1053.06,1090.71"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/7","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eC:\u003c/strong\u003e And who made the decision that this would be in Atlanta?","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=1090.71,1094.55"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/8","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eB:\u003c/strong\u003e Of course, Sergeant Joan Perron made the final decision, but Jenny Thompson, the assistant surgeon general for research under that old title was very influential in it. Doctor Draper was deputy surgeon general, had a voice, but, well, in all frankness, I was a Georgian. Atlanta I knew. I used to tell Doctor Louie Williams, I said, you were a Virginian, although you were born in Texas. He went to University of Virginia and really thought of himself as a Virginian. That let this be the first time Georgia ever got anything over on Virginia. Go ahead and settle on Georgia. I don't know how much influence I've had, but the decision was made for Atlanta.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=1094.55,1151.37"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/9","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eC:\u003c/strong\u003e We still think it was a good decision, by the way.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=1151.37,1153.466"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/10","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eB:\u003c/strong\u003e It was a very good decision. There's some little interesting comments, but I don't know whether you want to go into more detail. But that was.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=1153.466,1163.482"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/11","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eA:\u003c/strong\u003e This was in April of 19.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=1163.482,1164.93"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/12","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eB:\u003c/strong\u003e 444-242-4242 April of 42. My own. I had been detailed from the service. Well, first, after Dothan, Alabama, I was sent to Washington to NIH. NIH at that time was in the old Navy hospital at 23rd and E on a hill. Doctor McCoy Washington director and incidentally, interesting point. While there, Doctor McCoy had a tea, and it invited the staff and his office to celebrate the fact that NIH, for the first time in its history, had exceeded $1 million appropriation, $1,060,000 to. To be precise. So we served tea and wanted to have a toast. And it was tea, incidentally, that we had. So I'd served there for a year. And the Rockefeller foundation in the meantime, Rockefeller foundation had been interested in the southern states. They had a major program on the way. Doctor Platt Covington was the. The Rockefeller medical officer in charge of that. And I got to know him quite well in Savannah when we were working on this murine typhus problem and traveled with him. And he was, in getting me up to bishop, he said, I think you ought to go up and take a look at some of what Bishop is doing in malaria. So as an Assad, you might help a little bit on that. So he came into the surgeon general and talked still. That was Hugh Cumming. Doctor Cumming was still surgeon general. And he talked with Doctor Thompson. And he said, you know, I think the service ought to begin to think of detaching offices, detaching people to help states. And we've got a situation that needs some help in North Dakota. They've got a health officer and a statistician and a nurse, and they've got problems out there, major problems. It's growing. You've got several big industries coming in the slaughter houses. We're moving in to put out powdered milks and evaporate buttermilks. Raising turkeys were a major economic problem in North Dakota. And he said, we ought to try to set up some sort of environmental structure and why don't you let us have young Hollis to go out? So I was detached, kept on service assignments by giving the responsibility for the indian reservations in North Dakota. That was my service contract back to the regional office in Chicago. So that was essentially my background before MCWA.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=1164.93,1364.51"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/13","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eA:\u003c/strong\u003e But when MCWA was started in early 1942, you were a part of that.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=1364.51,1371.422"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/14","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eB:\u003c/strong\u003e Yes, I first went out and picked out the space down there because Doctor Williams had assignment in Washington. He said, you work out the space and history building that we were in before you built this. And then in the early days, I met a doctor, a practicing physician here, Doctor Glenn Giddings. I don't know whether that name rings a bell. He was very, very wonderful man, personality, but a very highly respected physician. Emery connected, spent a lot of his time on a faculty. He was the son in law of Mister Arkwright, who was the chairman of the board of Georgia Power. And he lived out in Druid Hills in the Arkwright home. We lived out in that area about a mile from his home. And I got to know him very well. He was, of course, much older than I was, but had a very delightful association. And he was the one, incidentally, that we, through Doctor Giddings and got interested in Emory, and Emory began to take an interest in the future, what we might ultimately do. Of course, at that time it was war effort. Doctor Giddings, incidentally, was a medical advisor to Coca Cola. So he was a highly respected man. I think his son took medicine and maybe practicing medicine in Atlanta. I don't know. I didn't know his son too well.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=1371.422,1473.26"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/15","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eA:\u003c/strong\u003e But that was the beginning of the CDC Emory tie.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=1473.26,1476.58"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/16","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eB:\u003c/strong\u003e Well, you know, it's hard to say. If you ask when was the initial idea of a future or a conversion of MCW? I don't know hardly how to, to put it. Doctor Perrin was prone to travel a good bit into the caribbean areas and into the Pacific, Hawaii and out. And quite often I went along to carry his briefcase, as it were. He would swing by and pick me up here. As I say, I was a devoted disciple of Perrine. I thought he was one of the really great medical health man of the world. His vision was so broad and the fact that I had the privilege of traveling with him a bit and talking with him and we talked about future of things. This was before the split, Adam, we knew in a vague, very vague sort of way about the Manhattan project, had no concept, of course, of the inner workings. But when that broke, and then in the meantime, we talked a good bit about my deep interest in the synthesized molecule. I said, you know, the potentials of this Doctor Perron are fantastic. I said, I made a trip up to Cincinnati and talk with Clarence Rukoff. Clarence Rukoff was the organic chemist of the service, a fantastic man, and he was in that early group. Real interesting story about that Sentinel station and Doctor Kerr, but it really has nothing to do with CDC. I went up and talked to Clarence about what you foresaw in this. What would be the problems likely would come because you could see the growth of synthetic materials coming out, the war spawn needs. We, for example, at service got the task of doing sanitation on Liberty ships. I had a hand in that. And right off, there's no point, if you're thinking of ships, that the life of them would be roughly less than three trips before they would be destroyed. There's no need of wasting critical materials. Let's go into synthetics and all the piping on there. This was beginning of plastic pipes, for example, the buildup and use of plastic pipes and ships. So we discussed some of these things with Doctor Perrin and I told him, I said, you know, Doctor Wayman in 1908, Doctor Kern, I said, doctor Kerr gave me a copy of that memo and it gave it to me in 1926. And Doctor Kerr made such a deep impression too, on his work. And he told me about his visit with Wyman in 19 eight. Now, that was the year I was born, he said. Wyman called me in and said, I'm convinced. And in the memorandum he repeated this, I'm convinced that cities are going to grow, industry's going to expand, and there will be all sorts of pollutants that's going to degradate the environment. Some of them will have major health significance, will have disease potentials, and the service had better begin to think about it. Although at that stage you were not too deep into domestic health, you were more still in the old public health service tradition. The name was still marine Hospital and public health service at that time, public health and marine hospital service. That was the act of 1902. But still he was beginning to think Wyman was a rather deep thinker in the future of the service, getting away from the old traditions, a transition type of service. And he commissioned our kerr to go out and find a station and set it up. There's a story on that which I won't get into, but finally, he wound up at the marine hospital in Savannah, the old Kilgore building, and that became the stream sanitation. And Wukoff was stationed there, and I was assigned there and worked out of there, my assignment with the army engineers on these impoundments when I was in Oklahoma on the canton imponent, designing that. So that background was in the picture. And I tell Doctor Perrin that if Rukoff's right and if, when this all gets over, the wasp is spawned all sorts of things. They've learned how I to miniaturize circuitry and airplanes, so that the old computers used to think of computers 12ft of wide, you know, and very complex, that if we can, if we could miniaturize this and get it down to where it could be applied, the vistas just loom. And I said, do you ever think about what the world is going to look like after World War Two? And he said, I thought about it a great deal. And I think he said, on the other side of it, chronic diseases, heart problems, cardiac, mental, these chronic problems are going to take over. And we've got to think of NIH as maybe adjusting it well. All that came into discussion toward the end of the war. So back on the transition, as I say, the states felt that they needed federal support. When these troops come back, because they weren't sure what they'd bring, there was a deep feeling on parents part less than the others, that you might, you ought to study these newer emerging diseases, particularly tropical infections, and have someone concentrating on that. But fundamentally, there was a recognized need, a real basic recognized need that the service now was getting into domestic soil health, a need for a center that would devote its full energies to field investigations. Because you had the NIH, under the act of 1990, it had been, the service name had been changed to public health service. NIH had evolved from the 1884 hygienic laboratory up in New England. Incidentally, it migrated to New York and had come to Washington. And then in 1930, it had changed its name to the National Institute of Health. But its fundamental function, its mission, was medical basic research, and likely would continue as such. It did do field investigations and would continue to do it as needed to back up the bench. But here the need was for a field oriented center, a center that would concentrate on field problems. It would do basic research, yes, but to the extent needed to back up the field, that would be the fundamental difference between the two institutions. And that leaked out. And there was a lot of reaction from some of the researchers that NIH, this would fraction contradiction and different problems with basic research, and they didn't like it. But for the record, I'd like to say that doctor Dyer never once. He didn't say much at first, but once it got underway, Gene Dyer supported it.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=1476.58,2020.322"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/17","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eA:\u003c/strong\u003e He was the director of NIH.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=2020.322,2021.418"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/18","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eB:\u003c/strong\u003e He was director of NIH at the time, fully not only in service with his own staff and. And the surgeon general's staff, but more importantly in his discussions on Hill. So that this was some of the background of it. The name that has to come out if you're going to get into the CDC is Joe Mountain. Doctor Joseph Mountain was a real giant in the transition and getting the public health service into domestic health problems of states. His vision in this area was fantastic. An interesting man because he cared not one eye odor about his own reputation, of what they thought about the mountain views. He pressed ahead very strongly and feel. And if one had to select a man, that was the fundamental strength behind the transition, be Joe Mountain. Of course, Doctor Perrin had agreed and approved, but Joe did the basic. Remember, he used to, I can get up to Senator Kerr, I can get to Senator George and explain to him he's on the appropriation committee. You see, we didn't need a congressional act. The service had the fundamental authority to set up CDC. But what you needed to be sure of is that you had the approval of your proper congressional groups, the committees and the Senate and House that would consider any legislation of the public health service would come before them, to be sure they agreed, but more importantly, that the appropriation committees would agree. There was a little background there that comes into play, because at the center here, I don't know whether either of you knew Krawik Stubbs and David. They were young medical officers attached to CDC. I mean, MCW at the beginning, both were highly competent artists. A third one was Bill Boyd, who incidentally is practicing medicine. And Augusta has a hospital clinic, I understand, over there. I'm not surprised. He was brilliant. I went to university when I was in engineering, he was taking landscape architecture. Finished that and then went into medicine. But he was highly skilled as an artist in sketches. And incidentally, in later years, he had two pages in Life magazine. I have a copy of those. Life was still in print when they were giving the painting the honoring, the medical, practical profession that had gone into artists work, paintings as a diversion, as a relaxation and so forth. He had two pages in there, five pictures. But they were getting into early stages of audio video operation, and in all frankness, I would have to say, have much interest in it. I didn't see how it fit into the war effort, but they were so persuasive. And Bill Boyd I kind of leaned on as an old colleague for advice, particularly in the medical area, and chatted with him one day, and I asked him, what you do about it? I said, Trevick and Dave Roo are so convinced that this has a place, how to argue about it? He said, well, you're only talking about a few colored pencils, some paper and a little thing and a little office, and they'll carry on their normal work anyway. Why don't you put them, see what happens? And it was fantastic what happened. They developed a group of people there that produced movies. We were developing some drainage, major drainage problems by explosives, worked out with the chemical corps. They were testing out some new explosives. So working with them, I got them to test them out, blowing out these, opening these ditches for us. They got pictures of all this and movies developed when we got in. DDT comes into the picture. We can't talk about CDC without bringing in DDT. And when we opened up, when the Marine typhus program broke and we got the orders out about DDT, they had pictures of the jeeps going and going before the Senate and House Appropriation committees. I took some of these pictures. George Tarver of Georgia, incidentally, was in charge of this, was chairman of this subcommittee hearing, these appropriations. Delightful gentleman, had been a judge for years, and he was impressed with these, and he would ask a lot of questions about it, how this works and so forth. And I often have said and told Dave later on that I thought the contribution that those two officers made in pushing this ahead with no real support meant a great deal to MCWA and getting its appropriation. And at the point of transition that we had no, really no opposition in Congress. It was the smoothest transition that I experienced before congressional committees. They bought the concept of the returning troops and that concern, and they agreed with Perrin on watching this look into the increased speed of transport, of passenger transport, to develop means of offsetting some of these influences and pressures that would come. So there really was no, we had a little more in service from the NIH until Jan Dar took the position. He did. Of course, that quieted that down a little more. One little more interesting point on that, on the transition of NIH that we probably into here, but back on the MCWA toward, and I'm not sure this date, but it must have been 43, perhaps, that Doctor Perrin called me one day and he said, I've just left a meeting in the Pentagon. I have an appointment on the hill before a committee. I have no time for any discussion, but we are under orders. I've accepted the responsibility of controlling typhus fever at all air fields in the United States that the training flies. So I'm turning this over to you. We're going to move Eske's operation over into MCWA and you handle it. And at that kind of tone, you say, yes, sir, and that's all. But in the meantime, we had come on the picture. Louis Williams foresaw the great advantages of DDT. He envisioned even that we could go up with the end of Canada and put DDT in the young birds that were going to migrate, and as they grew up, they would stop at the lake. Well, that seemed a little far fetched, but he pressed that, and I mention it only because it's in a paper formal document before the National Malaria Society when I was president that year. And Louis put this on the record, so it's a matter recorded, but we didn't really dabble. That didn't have to, because the impact of DDT was fantastic. And having remembered back when Doctor Herron gave us this order on typhus, that what we learned and Dothan about the behavior of Chia perspicus, that why fool with the rat? Eske was running a rat proof program. Well, he couldn't get appropriations. He couldn't get a materials to do much about it. He was not too well at that time. So when it came over, I said, we're going to forget the rat. Let's just concentrate. Our orders are to stop typhus. For some reason, of course, typhus fever has a mortality of probably 2% or less a person infected, particularly if he's a flyer that has some impact on him, that knocks his training out pretty much for a matter of months. And particularly susceptibles with the canadian boys, the british people coming in and the training around these and who develop these fossa in a few cases were cropping up and they were concerned. It was so fantastic that putting up, we put, as I recall, about 300 jeeps, equipped them, moved them out, two men only, because manpower was an issue, of course. Two man for jeep, put them out around these air fields concentrated only on the rat runs, DDT paying no attention to the ratified, and you could just see the disappearance of typhus in those areas. It was a fantastic outcome. While we had that, I perhaps should have inserted one other reason for the transition to MCWA was that and this impressed members of Congress. We've got the machine built, we've got the staff, we've got the equipment. Let's give malaria and typhus a knockout blow. Let's really once see if we cannot eradicate a disease or two diseases in the United States. And so that was another justification. And as a matter of fact, during my tenure, we were concentrating on that. Now maybe this is a good time to bring in, you know, everything wasn't euphoria. And some of us kind of coexisted with something a little bit short of true brotherly love, like my arguments with my good colleague Langneux, who, my respect as an epidemiologist, really world renowned. But Alex had little patience, little patience, no patience with impacts of non infectious impact. And I had envisioned even in 46, here in mid 46, by then, the split atom, as I say, we, the uncertainties of the future of the split atom, the euphoria that this would be perhaps the end of energy shortages, it would be the utopia of energy for the world. That picture the peacetime uses in other respects were bannered about. But there was still a deep concern in many minds about not being certain of these radiation impacts and stresses that would come with it. That was unknown. And with it, as I said before, the concerns with the synthesized molecule, you could project this and see all sorts of vistas coming before you in terms of how this would impinge on things that we would eat and that we would wear and that we would use, that would move in just a fantastic way, which, of course, it has. And so my concern initially, when I first came in and I discussed it with Doctor Perrin, that the world is going to be different, and one of the differences is going to be the impacts on environmental impacts, toxicities. Now, Hayes was here at that time, and Doctor Hayes was, I've forgotten, just when he came on the scene, whalen Hayes. Whalen Hayes. But he was, again, another delightful Mandev, great competence. And I used to discuss this problem with him. And I had envisioned, I had planned to set up what I was going to call at that time an environmental intelligence mechanism at CDC. And it was going to have a decided priority impact. It was going to take a look at all of these changing impacts in terms of the shift now from microbiology, not the shift, the broadening of microbiology into microchemistry and from acute to chronic, just as Perrin envisioned it, NIH, that there would be these chronic problems, environmental related. Rukoff had said that looking at the Kanawha river basin, which was spawned by war, need for synthetics, that the whole Ohio river is going to receive the byproduct waste and these are going to be. These are organics. They are all petrochemically oriented based. They are toxic of varying degree, and they are going to behave pretty much like inorganics. And that this was going to be, could be real issues that time you measured them and trace. But he said, when these get down to being measured in parts per billion, maybe, and ultimately in parts per million, in those concentrations, you want to have problems. So I wanted to really press this. As I say, Perrin agreed, you go ahead, do it. You got two years. But I didn't have two years. He wanted to move ahead sooner, so I got moved out. But I'd come back and Vandelier had no interest. None. And as I say, our good colleague Langmuir, whom I'd like to say on the record, there's just no way to put a good value on what Langmuir did in the field of medical epidemiology, far beyond what would show on the surface. He set up this training mechanism here. We had so many young medical officers coming out and coming down here. Many of them serve their medical commitment. Underlying mirror history shows how well he developed that corps of epidemiologists. I met many of medical schools, one of them at Lakeland, Brett Moore, whom I mentioned earlier. I talked to Brent the other day. I got a bad knee, and I had to go in and take a look at it and told him I was coming up. And he, busy as he was, I had to tell him. I said, you've got patients sitting out there. Well, I'm going to take another minute. You're going up there? He said, I don't, and I agree with him. He said that it's fantastic what the Langmuir influence and how it is permeated into medical schools and into medical practices, people that would not have thought that deeply about epidemiology. So I say, and I still say today, and I saw language. After his marriage, he had moved back up east. Down east, I guess we should say. Tom Gardner, who was a nice, delightful colleague, and I had a chance to meet with him, and I said, you know, alex, now that the heat's so often we've had our little spits, and I'm sure you confident you were right. I'm sure I'm confident I was right. So that'll never be settled. But I said, envision, if you will, what this country would look like if CDC had. If you had broadened out and go out, if you didn't want to waste your own time with it, if you thought it was a waste of time put a small nucleus of good medical people on this environmental issue. Look at it. That what might have been in this country if CDC had done in that field what they've done in infections, we would be spared much of this mess that we're in on the environment, these uncertainties, these discussions of threshold levels now with more emotionalism and extremisms than reality, no good scientific backup states making decisions on legalisms rather than on basic medicine. And I said, there's deep seated medical views here and in the, which I still think ought to receive tension that you've got the, what I call the stress induced phenomena coming on, the aggravations now of congestion, noise, tension, monotony, drug abuse, accidents, all this mental frustrations that you see. And one wonders, we think of man with its great resilience, human organism with its resilience and adaptive capacity that can mold itself to these things. And perhaps it can because people seem to be, and I stress the word seemed to be living and fair health in these heavy congested areas. But I wonder, I asked the question, I'm going to ask it this afternoon meeting is this a real or a pseudo adaptation? Are we at a point in the congestion where you begin to note I. Some characteristic changes like the NIH has done on behavior of rats when you confine them with a population environment that's suited for 40 rats and you develop 400 rats and see the behavior changes. I spent a little time in Japan after the war and get the congestion. Now I don't have the background and I don't want to comment it because I'm not competent to comment on it, but I think one could really, if we took a look at that from a deep seated medical viewpoint, that would see some characteristics forming there that might be worth our taking a look unless we really believe that our population and will balance off and get back to a more stable, less congested situation.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=2021.418,3342.03"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/19","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eC:\u003c/strong\u003e I have two questions. The first one, how did Alex respond? And number two, I'd like to go back to the early malaria days again.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=3342.03,3352.51"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/20","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eB:\u003c/strong\u003e Well, Alex was, he said this one day here, he said, you know, you talk about air pollution and that's. He looked out to Wendy and he says, you mean if you're talking about confined areas, if you're talking about industrial hygiene, I buy it, you convince me. But if you're talking about this outside ocean of air out here with man's little pittance interference, I don't buy that. He said, I'll tell you, I've looked back 20 years. This was, I say this because it was in a staff meeting here at CDC in about 52 or 53, we'd had the nora, we'd had some of these others. We had a look at the Los Angeles inversion picture and so forth. Well, those were freaks in his opinion. But I said the question. He said, I'd look back 20 years and I find nothing really, statistically even, that would tend to make you feel, unless you had a problem. And I said, alex, about 20, I would agree with you because I would respect your judgment on that. But I ask you to look ahead 30 years, look ahead to 1980, for example, and let's see and project what the trends we've got. I said, I can project some of them for you. We may be off, but we can give you some statistics on that. And then you think, as a medical mind, what and where on this curve might there be a problem? And then what I'm talking about is what I term projected epidemiology. I'm not interested in the background epidemiology, but as I say, we agreed to disagree on that and the CDC didn't pick it up. We tried to do it without CDC and Savannah, I mean, in Cincinnati, but we were without medical, good medical, deep medical thought, as I said back on this, when we were talking kind of a post mortemonic, that these things belong under good, broad, deep seated medical work and observation and checks such as you got at CDC. And it doesn't belong out where it is in the outline shadows of the Caduceus. And it's not going to work out there because there's not the basic competence that it's going to need to put it over. And I hold that that's exactly what's happened. And I even hold at the risk of really being on a limb that the. That the shift influence of medical, of public health in this country stems on the national level and into the states, because the public health leadership did not move into these environmental issues and had the fight up there in the late fifties when it was Dingell, Congressman Dingell, when Blacknick, Congressman Blacknick of Minnesota, said to Lee Bernie pointedly, it's a matter of record and the hearing that unless you medical people can broaden out and look at these pollutional problems, we're going to put this somewhere where it will be looked at. Now, to me, that with a man of blackneck strength in the House, backed by pretty much by Kerr, send it occur in the Senate. I talked to Senator Kerr about it and I told him that I think the problem is that we've got to split it. That the concern, I believe, of the medical people, of the public health people, state health officers, for example, and the service perhaps, is that the environmental issues are so broad, so terribly broad, that if you aren't careful, you would wind up with that environmental tail wagging a dog. And that I would accept that. But what we need to do is break it out. Just as we finally broke out the atomic problem, when the Atomic Energy Commission was judging jury and shooting off all those firecrackers out west and we said, there's problems here and all you can get out of the atomic Energy Commission, they're. But you've got sheep dying out there and the veterinarians tell us that it's radiation or related problem. And it wasn't until that split up, that's probably another story that had anything to do with CDC. But until the service had split out and got an agreement to build its own health physics group and its own rad health structure. And that was split so that you had a. You had a group that were really looking at the impacts with no responsibility for the action so that you could balance it. And it was on that basis that I thought that maybe we ought to split this off, that the public health service perhaps should not have been in the multibillion dollar sewage subsidy program. Matter of fact, I testified against it with Doctor Kerr. I thought that this was an unneeded we ought to put the utilities on a service paying basis. But this environmental issue went by the board and then state by state, and I don't know, over a handful of states today where the state health officer has any sort of a public health preventive program. And if you look at the emphasis, it's back now pretty much on curative medicine and tied in with how do you handle the medical cares and social problems which are important, obviously important. But I still raise the issue that such things as the rad health program belonged at CDC, not where I put it. But we couldn't get any action down here. So we set it up under my own little bureau structure up there and got Jim Terrell. We got two medical officers, Sam Ingram and lambs at my age, kind of go out, forgot the other one, and a small group of engineers. We gave them advanced training. We got them all at the doctorate level in health physics, as well as their engineers, and I think did a fantastic job. And the history of that program is just out. Jim Terrell wrote it. I can say this engineer is a lousy writer and I suffer the same fiction. So I can say that Jim wrote a lousy history in terms of a history, but the facts are there if you ignore the split infinitives and so forth. And I would hope that CDC might look at it. And it wasn't until I found out really that kind of in that part of it that that CDC. Now, well, first the Nam. I want to go back to the Nam because there was a lot of debate on Nam. What were you going to call this center? Jean Dar only raised one fundamental issue which torpedoed my thought early thought, whatever it is. Let's call it an american instrument institute to deviate from the National Institute of Summing on the thought that institute carried out the word of connotation. Gene Darr objected, and I think he was right. He said that we should have no word institute in it because in the first place, you're going to get contradiction, you're going to get confusion, you're going to get, it'll have a negative effect on budgets both ways. So he fought that. And as I say, I think he was right. The word institute, the word institute, he wanted it eliminated. So then we had all sorts of ideas and concepts. As I say, I sat up nights trying to figure out how I could get that environmental word in there, stuck in there somewhere crossways, but couldn't think of it, how to do it. Joe Mountain finally made this observation that actually we are defending this on infections and concerns about what might come backing upstate looking at complex problems and field investigations. So why don't we get the words in there of communicable diseases? That's what we're really focusing on at the moment. Recognizing, and this I wanted to put emphasis on because of his vision, recognizing that this isn't going to hold if we are successful, if we really put this over, this thing will have to be changed. But let's let some of our younger minds at that time figure out what they're going to do with it. And Gene Dara backed it. Peron agreed. And Doctor Draper, who didn't say too much normally in this sort of thing, he was more the minister because we went out and through the farm, my good colleague had put the x's on the ones we didn't take. And so in the meantime, I told Dave, we've got to move fast. I don't have any way to move these trucks. And the commitment is to get them off of the government site today. And this was in the morning hours. And so he called Florida, has a police, have a station right there in Jacksonville, the state troopers, highway troopers, and somehow they got eight troopers, and they came out, each in his own car, and they were under orders to help us move them. And I said, well, we haven't got anybody to drive them yet, but how will we do about that? And he said, well, if you want me to, I know we can get off duty troopers, a lot of them. If you want them. I said, get all you can get. We'll pay them. And so we had a parade. The state troopers gave us right away, and we moved 123 trucks there and showed up, bought them all. Didn't have an ex on. Went back. I wondered what was going to happen. So I went back to Washington and went in and. And I told Doctor Mountain, he said, you didn't buy that many trucks. How are you going to pay for them? I said, sir, Doctor Perrin said, get all you can get now. That's an order. He's got two stars. I got at that time, two bars. I said, got what we could get, 123, but it saved us. We had that. As to staff, it was a real problem at first. We got a the sanitary corps. Colonel Hardenberg had been activated, and he was in the sanitary corps. So he arranged first in emergencies around some of the bases where they had to have quick action to sign us. Some of the senator corps people, company from the army, from the army, had a little question of how we direct them between the two services. But it moved out. We didn't have any problems, and we moved then as fast as we could. We were very fortunate in getting the department. US Department of Agriculture has an entomology of plant quarantine bureau division. And they gave us, let us have three people headed by George Bradley, who was one of the top entomologists. And in the meantime, between George and myself, we enticed Fribo and get leave and take. We gave him a lieutenant colonelcy. In the meantime, we put Bradley on his major, his grad. So we had a gold leaf and a silver leaf as the officers. We got Doctor Mountain arranged for some officers coming. We got Stubbs and we got rue, and we got a few of the about four or five medical officers pretty fast. Louie had some contacts through bishop and others. So we began to assemble the staff, getting the feel together, getting the people enough people in the field. Now, these, by and large, were civil service people under the direction of the reserve officer that we put in the reserve Corps. They say it was tough going getting the another thing, we had to have all sorts of tools, shovels. So we went. I had a good colleague in Washington that was with WPA. That I knew when I was on the tax service in North Dakota, and he had in the meantime come into Washington winding up WPA and getting rid of all the equipment. So I got him on the phone, went up there. He said, you know, we got warehouses all over the country and we'd like to unload them. And of course the service wanted to get a list, but I said, they're not going to buy that now, Doctor Mountain, you've got to clear the way with the administrators down there. Give me permission to take the whole warehouse. That's what we got to do. It was the only way we're going to get it. He said, what are you going to get? And if you'll pardon expression, I said, I'll be damned if I know, but we'll get. I know we'll get thousands of shovels and all sorts of tools, hand tools of all kinds, and I don't know what else. And so he said, well, go ahead and take the warehouse. And that's what we did. In the meantime, a lot of agencies were getting a list of what they had and were looking at it, and they wanted this part and that part. Well, if they could unload the warehouse, they'd get it off the government shoulders and get on with the war. So we got the inside and we shipped them by Boxcar and every other way to Atlantic. And we got all sorts of things that got air press, compressors. We got a world of brand new tools that never been unpacked. So that gave us the tools. Then we had the trucks that we could get things going. So that's about the way it evolved. We were in business pretty fast. Didn't take us long. Within months, about that, about that, we had a nucleus and all areas. Puerto Rico was a problem. The malaria rate in Puerto Rico at the time, as I recall, was 122, 122.6 to be exactly recall. Well, you're going to have a pretty good sizable group of men down there. Vaughn was down there in the meantime. So I got a hold of Vaughn and told him, we'd better put a major effort in Puerto Rico, independent of Atlanta, because you can't get too far distant. Would you take them over and direct him? And he was delighted. He said, yeah, give me something to do. I don't have anything to do down here. So we got Jack Henderson as a real top flight engineer, very mature man. At that time. He was one of the top engineer malaria people at the state of Georgia. So he went down. So we set Puerto Rico up on that basis. Then we had the little outbreak of danger down in Key west with a submarine base, which gave us an opportunity to develop a mobile unit that we could put on flight transports and take down with staff. So we thought, well, we might have more of these. So we set up a broad scale emergency group under Wes Gilbertson. He was an engineer of some competence with us down here from the early days, he and Harry Hanson. And so about that time you had the big dangi epidemic outbreak in Hawaii, and that was again, Pentagon got together, and we got the call from Doctor Perrin, stop it. Whatever you need, you've got the authority, no limitations staff or anything. And I said, well, we've got mobile unit. We can load up mobile units, and we got Gilbertson here, we can get them over a matter of. He said, how long will it take us tomorrow? You're ready. You can get the planes down here, we'll load up and go, but we can't take enough men. So let me get Hardenberg, see if we could get army troops, companies attached to us. And they did. They came through. So we got over that a little interesting aside, Gilbertson got over there and he called me and he said, the army has attached a major to the two majors in charge of the troops. And he said, I've got my two little bars on them. And I said, well, I don't know whether I got authority, but by phone you were promoted to lieutenant colonel. Take your bars off if you met them yet. He said, no, but he said, I don't know how I should report to them or what. I said, you don't report. You were in charge of. You go down and get some silver leaves and put them on your shoulder and write you orders, promoting it to lieutenant colonel, and take it up and wash the blade. So we did. But he did a beautiful job on that, that set up. Well, I think in Furman's history, he got that well documented. And incidentally, back on Puerto Rico, I think we came out of there. No, I'm not sure the rate, but it was down around less than 20 or thereabouts. And incidentally, the malaria rate, I suppose this is recorded somewhere, but I remember it because it was so impressive that it was taken up, incidentally, in Washington, Walter Reid, the epidemiologist board, that the rate among service personnel in the continental United States was 0.6, a fantastic rate, considering what we're about to run out of tape.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=3352.51,4611.64"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/21","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eA:\u003c/strong\u003e Do you have another question that you'd like to ask?","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=4611.64,4614.768"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/22","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eC:\u003c/strong\u003e Go ahead, if you have one.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=4614.768,4618.81"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/23","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eA:\u003c/strong\u003e If you had it to do over, what would you do? Differently in terms of I'd fight harder.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=4618.81,4624.226"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/24","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eB:\u003c/strong\u003e They'd gotten environmental part to the precious integrated in CDC. Oh, it wouldn't have changed. Another thing wouldn't have certainly wouldn't have affected language. Great contribution because it was great. The risk of, and I don't mean this in any way except the historical fact, I would have tried to have reoriented Vandeleur a little bit more, to have taken a more aggressive interest. And if he, to have got a deputy that he could have turned much of it over to those two things about all that.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=4624.226,4675.66"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/25","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eC:\u003c/strong\u003e What was the single most important thing in your mind that gave CDC its reputation?","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=4675.66,4684.5"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/26","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eB:\u003c/strong\u003e I would hesitate to say. Well, I'm not sure really it wasn't. I knew his contribution because it came at a good time in the early years. It was so well done and of course the competence ahead. Well, first I think you've got to remember there was, we spoke of the returning troops and so forth, but attached to that was a lot of other activities. For example, the development of recognition that with air travel building up as it would, how do you control the importation of vectors, perhaps even infected vectors, because certainly we've got Aedes aegypti throughout the Gulf states and even up as far as Norfolk. And if you got some infected mosquitoes in here with yellow fever, you could have reintroduced yellow fever and yellow fever. Washington pretty prominent in Brazil and elsewhere in South America. You had plague beginning to move eastward in the wild rodent. We were just beginning under the MCWA to pick up a little of this what and where and how would that be faced. So that was part of CDC and I think overall that was well met on the spray. Of course, the early stages, you know, you got so many complaints because they were using crude insecticides and the complaints from passengers that they reacted to it or it was stifling and all this. And amongst CDC's contribution was aid in developing the old 43. I don't know what it's called now, but the standard effective insecticide against the flying insects or insects and yet no known or demonstrated impact on humans and a very pleasing odor. So a lot of other things that CDC did, just about everything they did was paid off.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=4684.5,4823.34"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/27","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eA:\u003c/strong\u003e Well, good. That's a good note to end on. Thank you very much.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=4823.34,4826.428"},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/28","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\u003cstrong\u003eB:\u003c/strong\u003e Coming. It, it.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447#t=4826.428,4827.928"}]},{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["English [Transcript]"]},"items":[{"id":"https://globalhealthchronicles.aviaryplatform.com/collections/2843/collection_resources/132667/file/247447/transcript/68957/annotation/29","type":"Annotation","motivation":"subtitling","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/file_transcripts/associated_files/000/068/957/original/transcript_1765819080.vtt20251215-2593616-esrj0i.vtt20251215-2593616-esrj0i?1765819080","format":"text/vtt","language":"en"},"target":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/file_transcripts/associated_files/000/068/957/original/transcript_1765819080.vtt20251215-2593616-esrj0i.vtt20251215-2593616-esrj0i?1765819080"}]}]}]}